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Abstract
Marriage regimes exist in many guises and forms. Economists have studied
monogamy and polygyny, the two most commonly encountered types, and pointed
to various benefits that can explain why and which individuals form conjugal unions
in each regime. However, many of these same benefits should favor polygamy over
monogamy more generally, including polyandrous and cenogamous marriages, which
are only rarely observed in practice. We show that human reproductive technol-
ogy in combination with regime-specific potential for conflict among parents of the
same and opposite sex over resources devoted to own children can explain why
monogamy is most common, polygyny frequent, polyandry rare, and cenogamy vir-
tually non-existent. Within-wives conflicts over resources also provide an alternative
explanation for why polygyny has historically been less common than monogamy
and why the former has declined in many parts of the world over the last century.
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1 Introduction
The most basic and commonly used classification of marriage regimes is dichotomous and
distinguishes between monogamy and polygamous forms. The latter includes polygyny
(one houseband, several wives), polyandry (one wife, several husbands), and cenogamy
(several wives and several husbands). Monogamy is by far the most common marriage
regime encountered, both today and historically. However, polygyny is still practised in
many cultures and regions, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa. Polyandry, in contrast, is
rarely observed, and cenogamy is virtually not practised anywhere.1
Economists have devoted most of their research to monogamy, and to a lesser extent
to the study of polygyny, but neglected by and large polyandry and cenogamy. At first
glance, the restriction in focus seems natural, given the predominance of monogamy, the
commonness of polygyny, the rareness of polyandry, and the virtual absence of cenogamy.
However, in several important respects this restriction is unsatisfactory and also poten-
tially misguiding our understanding of how marriage markets operate. First, it begs the
question why marriage, or socially-sanctioned inter-personal unions more generally, have
been through history almost exclusively organized only in the aforementioned regimes
of monogamy and polygyny, and not also in other possible arrangements, including
polyandry, cenogamy, or same-sex marriages.2 Second, and related, many of the very
benefits that are suggested in the literature as prime motives for individuals to form a
monogamous (or polygynous) conjugal union are not only asexual in kind, i.e. apply
equally to same-sex marriages, but should also with equal force compell individuals to
form same-sex, cenogamous, or polyandrous marriages. In fact, most of these motives,
including risk sharing, the exploitation of economies of scale and the specialization in
household, respectively market work, or the production and consumption of household
1Monogamy is the only permitted form of marriage in 14.7% of societies. Polyandry is practiced in
only 0.3%. No society has adopted cenogamy as its preferred marital structure. Polygyny is commonly
practiced in 46.4% of the world societies, and occasionally practiced in another 35.8% (calculations based
on Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas Codebook, 1998, World Cultures 10(1): 86-136.). However, even in
polygynous societies the majority of marriages are monogamous (see for example Wright, 1994, p. 91).
2Same sex marriages, or equivalent formal arrangements, have historically never been widely practised.
Apart from the more recent trend in postmodern societies to allow homosexual marriages (Weston 1997),
incidences of formal same-sex marriage have traditionally been practised only in confined ethnic groups.
Examples include the woman-woman-marriage among the Nuer, Igbo, and other African societies (cf.
Cadigan, 1998), where a barren woman marries another woman to become pater (social father) of her
children. The arbitrarily chosen biological father (genitor) plays no social role. The social character is
also true for the man-man marriages among the Kwakiutl (cf. Adams, 1981), where “chiefs without heirs
would turn their leg or a side of their body into a fictive ‘daughter’ and marry it off to a son-in-law in
order to pass on the legitimizing privileges.”
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public goods should actually favor polygamous over monogamous marriages.3 The simple
reason is that for each of these motives, the respective benefit that accrues to a single
member of a conjugal union is likely to increase (at least over some range) in the num-
ber of individuals to that same conjugal union. To cite but one example, consider the
risk sharing motive for marriage (cf. Weiss, 1997). If one man and one woman marry
and form a single household (pool their resources), they can benefit from reduced income
variance, if their respective individual income processes are not perfectly correlated. But,
following this line of argument, both can do even better by expanding their conjugal union
to a polygamous marriage (of any kind) to reduce the variance of household income still
further. Risk sharing but also the other motives mentioned above clearly cannot explain
why monogamy predominates, or why among polygamous regimes polygyny occurs much
more often than polyandry or cenogamy. Nor can they explain, more generally, why con-
jugal unions have been traditionally almost exclusively inter-sexual in nature. Finally, the
restricted focus in the economics literature on the analysis of monogamy and polygyny
potentially carries the risk to miss out on important factors that may underlie observed
trends or shifts over time in the relative occurence of particular marriage regimes, the
most notable example being the trend decline in polygyny and the concomittant rise in
monogamy in many parts of the world (see, for example, Gould, Moav, and Simhon,
2008).
The reasons for these shortcomings, we believe, stem from three related and basic, yet
major omissions in most of the economics literature on marriage: the importance of fertil-
ity considerations; the importance of sex differences; and the importance of own children
(as opposed to children that are not biologically one’s own). Regarding fertility consid-
erations, the ubiquitous inter-sexual nature of conjugal unions, be they monogamous or
polygamous of any kind, and the traditionally intimate relationship between childbearing
and marriage underscore that reproduction must be of central importance for individual
marriage decisions in all marriage regimes. Further support for this assertion is found
in the little-appreciated fact that own offspring is really the only household good that
requires inputs of both sexes for its production. No other household good, nor indeed any
of the other aforementioned motives for marriage identifed in the economics literature,
necessarily requires conjugal unions to be intersexual in nature. It is surprising that these
two facts have been so little appreciated in economic theories of marriage. The bearing
and rearing of children, no doubt, has always been mentioned in the economics literature
3See the chapter by Weiss (1997) in the Handbook of Family Economics for a review of these major
motives.
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as a primary motive for marriage. But until fairly recently, most economic theories of
marriage simply lacked an explicit account of fertility decisions in their analyses (Weiss,
1997).
Sex differences, well researched in other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, soci-
ology, anthropology, and psychology, have long been recognized as important determinants
of both individual and group behavior. Not so, or to a far lesser extent only, in economics.
The human (or more generally, the mammalian) mode of reproduction is characterized by
internal fertilization, prolonged gestation, and life birth of offspring. These features give
rise to two important asymmetries between women and men that are likely to heavily
influence their respective mating and parenting behavior, i.e. the reproductive strategies
of the two sexes. First, women can be absolutely sure about their motherhood (maternal
certainty), but men have to discount the risk that a kid born to one of their partners has
been fathered by another man (paternal uncertainty).4 This asymmetry is important, for
misattributed fatherhood constitutes a major threat to the reproductive success of men
and entails significant economic costs in terms of both time and resources expended for
parenting. Risks of cuckoldry hence tend to adversely affect male parenting levels, for the
more uncertain paternity is, the less willing men are, on average, to invest in their alleged
progeny (e.g. Alexander, 1974). At the same time, risks of cuckoldry make promiscuity
more attractive for men, both as a means to increase their expected number of offspring
(Bateman, 1948) and to diversify these same risks. Second, internal fertilization and ges-
tation, as well as a shorter female than male lifespan of fertility, significantly constrains
the reproductive capacity of women relative to that of men. In fact, for men, number of
own offspring is virtually limited only by their access to fertile mating partners. In the
non-economics literature, both asymmetries have been long documented to exert a quali-
tatively similar influence on the respective mating behavior of women and men and on the
amount of parental investment each sex is willing to devote to offspring, i.e. the respective
reproductive strategies pursued by the two sexes. In their strive for reproductive success,
a function of both the quantity and the quality of own children, men seek to maximize
offspring quantity rather than quality, with the reverse holding true for women (Trivers,
1972; Symons, 1979). In other words, men more than women tend to aspire to multiple
partners and women tend to contribute more than men to the rearing of children.5 These
4The cross-cultural and historic ubiquity of concerns about paternity uncertainty are vividly under-
scored in proverbs such as “mama’s babay, papa’s maybe”, the english equivalent to the ancient roman
dictum “mater certissima, pater semper incertus”.
5Male competition for females, a characteristic feature of the human mating system noted already by
Charles Darwin in his work on the descent of man (Darwin, 1871)
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behavioral differences between the two sexes have direct implications for the kind of mar-
riages that men, respectively women, if otherwise unconstrained, would want to engage
in and would want to avoid. Incomplete information on individual paternity gives rise to
externalities only in polyandrous and cenogamous marriages, but not in monogamous or
polygynous ones. In other words, in the former, within-marriage “cuckoldry” is possible,
which carries the risk for a polyandrous or cenogamous husband to misattribute parental
investment to offspring that is not his own but of another husband. This is not the case
in the latter. Men should therefore, and generally, strive for monogamous or polygynous
conjugal unions. At the same time, limited female reproductive capacity should induce
men to aspire more to polygynous than to monogamous marriages. Cenogamy, in turn,
like polygyny, provides a man with access to more wives than does monogamy, but unlike
polygyny it also carries the risk of cuckoldry because of the presence of co-husbands, a
risk that is all the greater in polyandry which has several husbands but only one wife.
The importance of own children has long been noted by economists, but largely ne-
glected in formal theoretical analysis of marriage.6 Becker, for example, anticipates that
the establishment of paternity limits the extent to which statements about the incidence
of polygyny can be mirrored on the occurrence of polyandry. He argues that “own chil-
dren are strongly preferred to children produced by others”. He also mentions the fact
that most polyandrous marriages are fraternal and states that “children of relatives are
preferred to those of strangers” (Becker, 1991, p. 102). Despite these insights, Becker’s
theoretical approach is not differentiating between own and other offspring. Individuals
derive utility from being with children and since there is no market where children can be
bought they have to be sired. Edlund stresses in her work the universality of the paternity
presumption in marital arrangements across societies (Edlund, 2005) and is consequently
modelling marriage as a contract that transfers custodial rights from women to men (see
also Edlund and Korn, 2002). Cox (2003) considers paternal uncertainty in the context of
intervivos gifts and Saint-Paul (2008) shows that paternity uncertainty of males and lim-
ited reproductive capacity of females lead to positive assortative matching and potentially
less human capital for offspring. The first formal treatment of the importance of own chil-
dren in the context of marriage can be found in Bethmann and Kvasnicka (2011).7 There,
the existence of marriage as an institution is attributed to the need to curb cuckoldry for
the purpose of paternity certainty and biparental investment in offspring. It is shown that
6However, more and more economists seem to think that the inclusion of evolutionary approaches in
the economics of the family might provide new insights. See Cox and Fafchamps (2007) for a discussion.
7The earliest preprint of this paper is Bethmann and Kvasnicka (2005).
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unregulated mating leads to market failure and that a stringent marriage regime is able
to realize a second best outcome. Francesconi et al (2010) use a similar argument in a
model with overlapping cohorts and mate guarding among men. Own children is not only
the only household good that requires inputs of both sexes for its production, as noted
above, it is also the only household good whose utility from consumption depends on
who produced the good. This simple fact is of utmost importance in polygamous unions
because children can no longer be classified as household collective goods as would be
the case in the traditional economics literature. In polygamous marriages, a child, which
by nature has only one mother and one father, ceases to be a household collective good
for any third party (male or female) in that marriage (only parents by definition derive
utility from own kids). This creates conflict between parents and third parties about the
individual allocation of resources, including possibly common household resources.
We believe that fertility considerations, sex differences, and the greater valuation of
own children are key for understanding and explaining the rank order of marriage regimes
in terms of their relative occurences, and by extension, also their changing fortunes over
time. The rank order, both stable over time and ubiquitously encountered, can by def-
inition only be caused by equally stable and ubiquitously encountered factors. Fertility
considerations, sex differences, and the importance of own children are such stable and
ubiquitously encountered factors, as none is confined to particular cultures, times, eco-
nomic systems, or regions of the world. Marriage has always been intimately linked to
fertility, and asymmetries in offspring recognition and in reproductive capacity between
the two sexes are instrinsic features of the human mode of reproduction. Similarly, a
greater valuation of own offspring is a deeply ingrained evolutionary drive. As none of
the aforementioned factors is in any way confined to particular cultures, times, economic
systems, or regions of the world, these reproductive concerns clearly qualify as potential
candidate explanations. What is more, ample corroborative evidence underscores their
pivotal and ubiquitous importance for mating markets and their societal regulations. Ex-
amples include inferior investment in offspring by patrilineal rather than matrilineal kin
(e.g. Gaulin et al., 1997), greater investment of brothers into the children of their sisters
in societies where own paternity is highly uncertain (Alexander, 1979), the dependence
of rules of inheritance of a man’s property across societies on paternal confidence (Gaulin
and Schlegel, 1980; Hartung, 1985), and the relationship between average levels of pater-
nal uncertainty and rules governing consanguineous marriages or inbreeding in societies
(Greene, 1978). Moreover, the once exclusive definition of adultery with respect to the
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marital status of women in many societies (e.g. Bullough, 1976) and the general impor-
tance attached to female premarital chastity (e.g. Buss, 1989) both bear witness to the
pivotal role of own paternity.
In our analysis, child quality has the character of a collective good among parents,
i.e. the father benefits from the mother’s contributions to the quality of her child and
vice versa. Because individuals do not make decisions as one generic actor but instead
behave non-cooperatively, they do not internalize the effects on their partners’ utility
when contributing to the quality of a child. Samuelson’s condition for the efficient pro-
vision of a collective good (cf. Samuelson, 1954), therefore, will not be met. However, it
turns out that polygamous unions even have difficulties to ensure a minimum constraint
on technical efficiency where the ratio of female and male utility losses stemming from
their marginal child quality contributions is equal to the technical rate of substitution
between female and male contributions. This observation is particularly true for those
unions with multiple husbands. Monogamy, in contrast, achieves this technical efficiency.
In principle, polygyny can achieve it, too. However, not necessarily so, and what is even
more competition for male support among cowives might lead to welfare losses. Polyan-
drous arrangements lead to inefficient child quality contributions and are therefore quite
unattractive. Consequently, these but also cenogamous arrangements carry some inherent
instability.
Intuitively, these results are easily understood. Monogamy completely removes in-
formation asymmetries stemming from paternal uncertainty. Polygyny also ensures that
males can be certain about their fatherhood. However, the allocation of the husband’s
quality contributions among his children has the potential for jealousy and conflict among
his cowives. Under polyandry, paternity cannot be established with certainty such that
males only maximize expected utility. Male quality contributions, as a consequence, are
only suboptimal. A cenogamous marriage is unstable because there is often one couple
that could form a monogamous union that provides a higher level of utility.
2 The Model
The following analysis compares the different marriage regimes in terms of their respective
costs and benefits. We gain insights into the internal mechanisms such that we can explain
the widespread occurrence of polygyny, the rareness of polyandry, and the nonappearance
of cenogamy. For simplicity of exposition, we will assume that marriage is a necessary
pre-condition for the bearing and rearing of children. That is the costs of out-of-wedlock
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childbearing are assumed to be infinitely high. The interested reader is referred to Willis
(1999) for an excellent paper on the theory of out-of-wedlock child bearing. The repro-
ductive nature of our definition of marriage requires any marital arrangement to consist of
a male and a female part (husband and wife). Depending on whether a role is filled with
one or several individuals, one can distinguish between monogamy, polygyny, polyandry,
and cenogamy. Our focus is on the different implications that these marital structures
have on the efficiency of human reproduction.
Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to marital arrangements with at most two mem-
bers of the same sex in the same union. As with the perfect enforcement of marriage
as a pre-condition for child birth this assumption merely simplifies our exposition. The
results, however, can of course be generalized. Table 1 summarizes the composition of the
four marital arrangements.
Table 1: Types of Marital Structure
Marital arrangement Husbands Wives
Monogamy one one
Polygyny one two
Polyandry two one
Cenogamy two two
2.1 The Fertile Population
Consider a society populated by single-period lived fertile women and men with equal
preferences, where the two sexes differ with respect to their reproductive technology.
More formally, the fertile population consists of two disjoint subsets. First, the set  of
female individuals with typical elements f , g, and h:
f, g, h ∈  (1)
Second, the set  of male individuals with typical elements m and n:
m,n ∈  (2)
Finally, let  =  ∪  denote the fertile population with typical element i:
i ∈  (3)
All individuals are rational and act non-cooperatively. They can spend their economic
resources on two competing uses: own non-reproductive consumption and parental invest-
ment in children. Economic resources summarize an individual’s endowment with wealth,
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time, and other means. The respective level of endowments with these resources may well
vary among individuals.
2.2 Preferences, Endowments, and Reproductive Technology
Male and female individuals have economic resources Yi and derive separable utility W
from consumption Ci and reproductive success, which is a function of both the number
Ki and the quality Q of own biological offspring:
W (Ci, Ki, Q) = U(Ci) + V (Ki, Q) (4)
As Q enters into the utility functions of both sexes, maternal investment in children affects
paternal utility and vice versa. Child quality, therefore, has collective good character (see
among others Smith, 1977, or Weiss and Willis, 1985). Function U is assumed to be
twice differentiable and increasing at a diminishing rate. The same assumptions hold for
function V with respect to Q the (continuous) quality of children, i.e.
∂2U(C)
∂C2
< 0 <
∂U(C)
∂C
and
∂2V (K,Q)
∂Q2
< 0 <
∂V (K,Q)
∂Q
(5)
With respect to K, the (discrete) number of children, we still assume that V is increasing
and strictly concave, but differentiability is not necessary. Furthermore, we assume that
utility from reproduction is equal to zero if the quantity and/or quality of own offspring
is zero:
V (0, Q) = V (K, 0) = 0 (6)
We want to stress that sex is an important individual characteristic in our model. In par-
ticular, we focus on two differences with respect to reproductive technologies. Extended
times of gestation and lactation, as well as a shorter life-time span of fertility, constrain the
reproductive capacity of females (limited reproductive capacity, see, for example, Trivers,
1972). Following Willis (1999), we will assume that this limitation is always binding and
normalize the number of births per woman to one, i.e.
Kf = 1 (7)
Moreover, because of internal fertilization and life birth women are always certain about
their motherhood (maternal certainty). Male reproductive capacity is only limited by the
number of female mating partners, i.e.
Km ∈ {0, .., |Fm|} (8)
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where Fm is the set of females a man has mated and |Fm| denotes the number of women
in this set. Note that it is possible that a man fathers no child at all even though he has
mated with several women. In case his partners have mated with other men, he has to
account for the possibility that a child is fathered by someone else. In fact the probability
of biological fatherhood (δ) is inversely related to the number of men his partner has
mated:
δf =
1
|Mf | (9)
whereMf is the set of men female f has mated and |Mf | denotes the number of men in this
set. As a consequence, men may only maximize their expected utility from reproductive
success in (4).
Contributions to child quality have their price. We denote by as, with s ∈ {,},
the marginal cost at which additional contributions to child quality can be obtained.
Individual contributions to the quality of a child are given by qif , where i stands for the
individual that invests and f represents the beneficiary child with mother f .8 Thus female
and male individuals face the following budget constraints:
Yf = Cf + aqff and Ym = Cm + a
∑
f∈Fm
qmf (10)
By choosing qif , individuals maximize their (expected) utility (4) subject to their budget
constraints (10).
2.3 Parental Investment and Child Quality
Child quality Q = Q(q, q) is determined by an aggregator function with maternal and
paternal investments as arguments. We assume that both the female and the male con-
tributions display positive but diminishing marginal returns to the quality of a child:
∂2Q(q, q)
∂q2
< 0 <
∂Q(q, q)
∂q
and
∂2Q(q, q)
∂q2
< 0 <
∂Q(q, q)
∂q
(11)
Furthermore, we assume that function Q is characterized by constant returns to parental
investments taken together:
Q(tq, tq) = tQ(q, q) (12)
Maternal certainty means that the biological mother is the only female that contributes
to the quality of a child. With paternal uncertainty, in contrast, all partners the mother
8Since we assume that mothers bear exactly one child, the subscript f uniquely identifies a child.
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has mated qualify as potential fathers of her child. As a result, all of them will invest in
the quality of their putative offspring. Total male contributions (qf ) to the quality of the
child mothered by female f , therefore, are the sum of the individual male contributions:
qf =
∑
m∈Mf
qmf (13)
Because of the collective good character of child quality, therefore, the true but unknown
biological father may benefit from contributions of other men to the quality of his child.
As a consequence, total quality of the child mothered by female f is given by:
Qf = Q(qf , qf ) (14)
where we have used qf = qff .
A man who has mated more than one female partner needs to be discussed in greater
detail. Since his female partners and hence their offspring might not be identical (because
we allow for heterogeneous endowments), the question arises what his reproductive success
with respect to quality is. We argue that men care about some measure of average child
quality. To ensure that our results are as general as possible we assume the following
constant elasticity of substitution aggregation procedure:
Q¯
( ⋃
f∈Fm
Qf
)
=
[∑
f∈Fm
1
|Fm|Q
φ−1
φ
f
] φ
φ−1
(15)
where Qf is the quality of a child mothered by female f . Since the numbering of children
should not influence a man’s utility, we use the same share parameter for each child
(1/|Fm|). The parameter φ measures the degree of substitutability, such that its inverse
relates to the degree of complementarity. If φ → ∞ holds, the quality of one child
is a perfect substitute for the quality of another child and males simply focus on the
arithmetic mean of offspring quality. In case φ → 0 holds, the quality of one child is a
perfect complement for the quality of another child. In this case, the child with the lowest
quality determines Q¯ and males tend to favor child quality investments that eliminate
differences between their children. In between those extremes, our specification allows for
the whole range. Note for example that average child quality Q¯ refers to the geometric
mean when the degrees of substitutability and complementarity are the same (φ = 1).
2.4 Reproduction and Marital Structure
In the following analysis, the bearing and rearing of children requires that agents are
married. Each marital structure (summarized in Table 1), however, has certain impli-
cations on individual reproductive success. The sets of mating partners of monogamous
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and polygynous women consist of only one element, such that monogamous and polygy-
nous men can be sure about their fatherhood (see equation (9) above). Polyandrous and
cenogamous women, in turn, mate with two men such that polyandrous and cenogamous
men have to account for the possibility that the child is fathered by their cohusbands
(paternal uncertainty). In the case of polyandry, the expected number of children is one
half, E[Km|polyandry] = 12 , in the of cenogamy, E[Km|cenogamy] = 1. In polygynous and
cenogamous unions, a man invests in two children. Monogamous and polyandrous men,
in contrast, invest in a single child.
3 Analysis
In this section we analyse female and male behavior under the different marriage regimes.
Under monogamy, both spouses will have only one child and they will both be absolutely
certain about their parenthood. As a consequence, their utility maximization problems
are identical and can therefore be studied simultaneously (cf. Section 3.1). Moreover,
given their husbands’ decisions, the optimization problems of polygynous, polyandrous,
and cenogamous wives are identical to the monogamous case such that we can refer to
the female strategy under monogamy. Optimal male strategies in contrast do depend on
the respective regime (see Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 for the polygynous, polyandrous, and
cenogamous cases).
3.1 Monogamy
Under the monogamous marriage regime, individuals have exactly one partner of the op-
posite sex. On the one hand, this reduces the natural reproductive capacity of males.
The only limit nature sets is access to female partners. On the other hand, any uncer-
tainty about biological fatherhood is eliminated under monogamy. As a result, male and
female individuals face the same optimization problem. Spouses choose their optimal
contribution to the quality of their common child qsf , s ∈ {,}, to maximize utility:
{qsf} = argmax {U(Yi − asqsf ) + V (1, Q)} , s =
{
, if i = f ∈ 
, if i = m ∈  (16)
Their first order necessary conditions read as follows:
as
∂U(Ci)
∂C
=
∂V (1, Q)
∂Q
∂Q(qf , qf )
∂qs
, s =
{
, if i = f ∈ 
, if i = m ∈  (17)
where Ci denotes the non-reproductive consumption of individual i. Optimal contribu-
tions to child quality equate the marginal losses in non-reproductive utility to the marginal
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increase in utility due to higher child quality. Because of the collective good character
of child quality, however, the wife’s decision influences the husband’s and vice versa. By
dividing their respective optimality conditions, we obtain the following expression:
a
a
∂U(Cm)/∂C
∂U(Cf )/∂C
=
∂Q(qf , qf )/∂q
∂Q(qf , qf )/∂q
(18)
Hence, the ratio of female to male marginal child quality costs multiplied by the shadow
values of lowering the respective budget constraints is equal to the technical rate of substi-
tution between female and male contributions to child quality. The case where a marginal
male contribution is used to reduce female contributions, so that the quality of the child
remains constant, illustrates the basic intuition. The condition simply says that the par-
ents are in optimum when the mother’s utility gain equals the father’s loss in utility.
Note that this ensures some kind of technical efficieny in the generation of child quality.
Samuelson’s condition9 for efficiency in the provision of a collective good, of course, is
not met here because individuals behave non-cooperatively.10 In the following we will see
that even the minimal requirement of technical efficiency in (18) might fail in polygamous
unions.
From equation (18), we can infer that the marriage market outcome would be charac-
terized by positive assortative matching with respect to wealth (Y ) because a wealthier
man attracts a wealthier woman and vice versa. The fact that the efficiency condition
holds provides a rationale for mating market regulations that aim at enforcing monoga-
mous mating.
3.2 Polygyny
In polygynous marital arrangements, men gain access to more than just one female partner
as is the case under monogamy. Consequently, male reproductive capacity is enhanced.
At the same time, husbands can be certain about their fatherhood under polygyny. Hence,
polygynous marriages are favorable for men. The utility maximization problem for a man
with two wives reads as follows:
{qf , qg} = argmax
{
U(Ym − aqf − aqg) + V
(
2, Q¯(Qf , Qg)
)}
(19)
9Samuelson’s condition requires the right hand side of the first order conditions in (17) to be multiplied
by two such that child quality will be higher.
10Non-cooperative behavior is, of course, crucial in our analysis. Note, however, that the costs of
enforcing and controlling collusive agreements are likely to increase with the number of individuals such
that cooperative behavior within the different marital agreements comes at different costs.
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where Qf (Qg) refers to the child mothered by wife f (g). Turning to the husband’s first
order necessary conditions with respect to his child quality contributions, we obtain for
the optimal qf :
a
∂U(Cm)
∂C
=
∂V (2, Q¯)
∂Q
1
2
(
Q¯
Qf
)1
φ ∂Q(qf , qf )
∂q
(20)
A comparison of (20) with its equivalent under monogamy (17) reveals two differences.
The first difference refers to the quantity of own offspring. The fact that V is evaluated at
Km = 2 shows that a polygynous husband benefits from a higher quantitative reproductive
success. Note that this is not the case for the polygynous cowives (Kf and Kg are still
equal to one). A fact that introduces an asymmetry between spouses under polygyny.
The second difference is related to the husband’s child quality contributions. Since the
two children are mothered by different women, male contributions to child quality might
have different marginal effects on average child quality Q¯. In fact, equation (20) and its
equivalent for qg imply that the polygynous husband’s marginal utilities stemming from
children f and g must be the same. Consider, for example, the case where qf > qg
holds, that is cowife f contributes more to the quality of her child than cowife g. The
polygynous husband will choose child quality investments such that
qf
qf
≤ qg
qg
⇔ qf
qg
≤ qf
qg
(21)
Hence, male child quality investments are such that the marginal change in the quality of
child f is never higher than the marginal change in the quality of child g:
∂Q(qf , qf )
∂qf
≤ ∂Q(qg, qg)
∂q
(22)
In this sense, the husband will never exaggerate child quality differences. However, given
qf ≥ qg holds it can be shown that the quality of child f is never below that of child g,
that is Qf ≥ Qg. These observations hold independently of the degree of substitutability
between the qualities of the two children (φ).
Dividing condition (20) by its equivalent for the contributions to the quality of child
g helps us understand how the husband allocates resources between his two offspring:
∂Q(qf , qf )/∂q
∂Q(qg, qg)/∂q
=
(
Qf
Qg
)1
φ
(23)
Hence, at the optimum the polygynous man contributes to the quality of his children
such that the ratio of the marginal changes in each child’s quality is equal to the technical
rate of substitution between the quality of his two children. Since the man derives utility
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from the average quality of his children, he only has to consider the marginal effect of
his contributions on each child and how this affects the average quality of his offspring.
Consequently, functions U and V which specify his preferences play no role. In a sense,
one can think of the man’s decision as follows. After deciding how many resources to
invest in total, he has to decide how to allocate them among his children. In particular,
he will ensure that the ratio of the marginal child quality changes with respect to male
contributions equals the technical rate of substitution between the qualities of his two
children.
At first glance this mechanism seems to be rather technical, but note that there is a
huge potential of conflict between the husband and his wives but also among the cowives.
One reason why a mother invests in her offspring may be to attract investments by her
husband. This is possible since her contributions change the technical rate of substitution
between the qualities of his two children, i.e. the right hand side of (23). Therefore, a
contribution by one cowife changes the husbands allocation of male contributions among
his children which in turn affects the other cowife. The extent to which a wife is able
to attract additional male child quality contributions depends on the degree of substi-
tutability (respectively on the degree of complementarity) between female and male child
quality contributions.
Anthropologists have long noted that cowives have difficulties to get along (see, for
example, Stephens, 1963; Jankowiak, Sudakov, and Wilreker, 2005). Among economists,
Shoshana Grossbard has also studied conflict among cowives. In her book (Grossbard-
Shechtman, 1993, p. 236/7), she lists four arrangements that aim to reduce frictions in
polygynous unions. First, a separate dwelling for each cowife (so-called hut polygyny)
which is practiced in more than 62 percent of all polygynous societies (cf. Murdock,
1967). Second, supervisory authority in the hands of the senior cowife. Third, customs
where husbands cohabitate with each cowife in regular rotation. Fourth, sororal polygyny
where the husband is married to a group of sisters (one in seven polygynous societies
prefers sororal arrangements, see again Murdock, 1967). All four arrangements show that
the potential for conflict among cowives is taken seriously in polygynous societies. In
principle, however, our efficiency criterion can still be met.
The efficiency condition is obtained by dividing the female and male first order neces-
sary conditions:
a
a
∂U(Cm)/∂C
∂U(Cf )/∂C
=
∂Q(qf , qf )/∂q
∂Q(qf , qf )∂q
1
2
(
Q¯
Qf
) 1
φ ∂V (2, Q¯)/∂Q
∂V (1, Qf )/∂Q
(24)
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As mentioned above, the change in average child quality influences the husband’s decisions
and because there is no corresponding expression for his wives, it appears in the efficiency
condition. Similarly, female and male marginal reproductive success with respect to child
quality do not cancel each other out because both sexes’ quantitative reproductive success
differs. Nevertheless, (close to) efficient outcomes are attainable if the following conditions
hold:11
1
2
(
Q¯
Qf
)1
φ
≈ ∂V (1, Qf )/∂Q
∂V (2, Q¯)/∂Q
and
1
2
(
Q¯
Qg
)1
φ
≈ ∂V (1, Qg)/∂Q
∂V (2, Q¯)/∂Q
(25)
Our analysis of polygynous unions shows that a man’s endowments Ym determine
whether he can attract a second wife. In fact, there is huge evidence that wealthy men
engage in polygynous mating, whereas men of low economic status may have to remain
monogamous, or even single (see, for example, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1986). Polygynous
cultures, both past and present, seem to conform well with this characterization (see,
for example, Betzig, 1992/95, for evidence on ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and
various European cultures in the Middle Ages; or Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987, and Sellen,
1999, on contemporaneous African societies).
3.3 Polyandry
As we have seen, polygyny may be viewed as a means of men to increase their reproductive
success by increasing their number of offspring. Similarly, polyandry might help women
to acquire more male quality contributions. However, a polyandrous man (m) is uncertain
about his fatherhood, i.e. he can only maximize expected utility:
{qmf} = argmax {U(Ym − aqmf ) + E[V (Km, Q)]} (26)
Since a polyandrous woman mates with two husbands, their probability of fatherhood is
only one half. As a consequence, expected male utility from reproduction is given by:
E[V (Km, Q)] =
1
2
V (1, Q) (27)
Note that equation (6) allows us to drop the expectations operator in (26). The first order
necessary conditions of the two husbands under polyandry are as follows:
a
∂U(Cm)
∂C
=
1
2
∂V (1, Q)
∂Q
∂Q(qf , qmf + qnf )
∂q
= a
∂U(Cn)
∂C
(28)
11Note that these conditions can be true for both wives, for one, but also for none.
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where n denotes the second husband. In contrast to the monogamous case in equation
(17), marginal utility from reproduction in (28) is divided by two which is due to the fact
that men maximize only expected utility. Apart from that, the interpretation of condition
(28) is similar to that of equation (17). Note, however, that the true but unknown father
free rides on his cohusband’s child quality contributions. Division of the husband’s first
order necessary condition (28) by his wife’s leads us to:
a∂U(Cm)/∂C
a∂U(Cf )/∂C
=
1
2
∂Q(qf , qmf + qnf )/∂q
∂Q(qf , qmf + qnf )/∂q
(29)
This expression is necessarily suboptimal (cf. equation (18)) and its deviation from the
efficient outcome is caused by paternal uncertainty. Female contributions to child qual-
ity are too high, or male contributions too low, or both.12 Moreover, if the husbands’
endowments are not equal, the wealthier husband contributes more to the quality of his
putative offspring:
Ym > Yn ⇔ qmf > qnf (30)
In fact, the poorer husband may even completely free ride on his cohusband’s contributions
in case his resources are much lower than those of his cohusband:
a
∂U(Cm)
∂C
≤ ∂U(Yn)
∂C
⇔ qnf = 0 (31)
In this case, it can be shown that the wealthier husband and his wife would have been
better off in a monogamous union. Such a polyandrous union, therefore, is likely to be
dissolved, or better: it is very unlikely to be formed in the first place. This result and the
case where the poorer cohusband does contribute to the child’s quality are summarized
in our first proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider a polyandrous marriage with two cohusbands (m and n). With-
out loss of generality, assume that Ym ≥ Yn holds. Cohusband m would be better off in
a monogamous union with a noninvolved female g that contributes as much resources to
child quality as his polyandrous wife f , that is qf = qg. In case cohusband n restrains
totally from contributing to child quality (qnf = 0), the polyandrous spouses m and f
would have been better off in a monogamous union.
The Appendix provides a formal proof of this result.
12This result constitutes an example of the Hamilton rule (cf. Cox, 2003).
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3.4 Cenogamy
Cenogamy occassionally occurs in polyandrous societies (Ingoldsby, 2006, p. 109). A sec-
ond wife may be brought into a polyandrous arrangement when one or more cohusbands
are unhappy with their marriage, with barrenness of the wife being one but not the only
reason. Nancy Levine (1988, p. 149) writes that cenogamous marriages “continue to be
initiated - quite deliberatedly - and the proximate reason is to ensure equity in marriage
for all brothers.” The polyandrous wife faces male expectations of a son from marriage
and has to satisfy domestic labor obligations. Consequently, Levine’s observations sug-
gest that the probability of turning fraternal polyandrous arrangements into cenogamous
marriages mainly depends on two factors. Cenogamy is more likely to occur the higher
the number of married brothers. The same is true, in case the brothers do not share
the same parentage. From a societal point of view, however, cenogamous arrangements
are “strongly discouraged because bringing more than one childbearing woman into the
marriage makes serious domestic discord more likely, breaks down fraternal solidarity by
creating separate families, and lays the foundations for partition” (Levine, 1988, ibidem).
From an analytical point of view, cenogamy bears features of polygyny and polyandry.
On the one hand, men invest in offspring born to several wives like in a polygynous union.
On the other hand, children maybe fathered by a cohusband like in a polyandrous union.
The optimization problem of a man living in cenogamy is therefore given by:
{qmf , qmg} = argmax {U(Ym − aqmf − aqmg) + E[V (Km, Q)]} (32)
where qmf (qmg) denotes cohusband m’s contributions to the quality of the child born to
cowife f (g). Note that paternal uncertainty implies the following for his expected utility
from reproductive success:
E[V (Km, Q)] =
1
4
V (1, Qf ) +
1
4
V (1, Qg) +
1
4
V
(
2, Q¯(Qf , Qg)
)
(33)
As a result, the cenogamous husband contributes to the quality of the child mothered by
cowife f according to the following first order necessary condition (first equality):
a
∂U(Cm)
∂C
=
1
4
∂Q(qf , qf )
∂q
[
∂V (1, Qf )
∂Q
+
∂V (2, Q¯)
∂Q
1
2
(
Q¯
Qf
)1
φ
]
= a
∂U(Cn)
∂C
(34)
where qf denotes total male investments to the quality of the child mothered by wife
f , that is qf = qmf + qnf . Because of the undetermined paternity and the collective
good character of child quality, the expected marginal increase of reproductive success
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stemming from an additional child quality contribution is the same for both cohusbands.
This is of course true with respect to both children. As a consequence, the marginal utility
from non-reproductive consumption is the same for both cohusbands (second equality).
We are led to the following observation:
Observation 1 Let qf > qg hold, that is cowife f contributes more to the quality of her
child than cowife g. Then the two cohusbands will choose child quality investments such
that
qf
qf
≤ qg
qg
⇔ qf
qg
≤ qf
qg
(35)
holds. Hence, male child quality investments are such that the marginal change in the
quality of child f is never higher than the marginal change in the quality of child g:
∂Q(qf , qf )
∂qf
=
∂Q(1,
qf
qf
)
∂qf
≤
∂Q(1, qg
qg
)
∂q
=
∂Q(qg, qg)
∂q
(36)
In this sense, the two cohusbands will never exaggerate child quality differences. The
quality of child f , however, is still never below the quality of child g, that is Qf ≥ Qg.
These observations hold independently of the degree of substitutability between the qualities
of the two children (φ).
In case that the two cohusbands’ differ with respect to their economic wealth, the left
hand side of equation (34) implies that the wealthier cohusband contributes more to the
quality of the two children:
Ym > Yn ⇔ qmf + qmg > qnf + qng (37)
The exact shares a man devotes to his two putative offspring, however, can not be de-
termined. But because of the symmetry of (34) between the two husbands and across
the two children, there is no source for conflict among cohusbands. A closer look at the
cohusbands’ conditions for optimal child quality contributions helps us to understand how
they allocate resources between their two putative offspring:
∂Q(qf , qf )/∂q
∂Q(qg, qg)/∂q
(38)
=
(
∂V (1, Qg)
∂Q
+
∂V (2, Q¯)
∂Q
1
2
(
Q¯
Qg
)1
φ
)
/
(
∂V (1, Qf )
∂Q
+
∂V (2, Q¯)
∂Q
1
2
(
Q¯
Qf
)1
φ
)
Note the difference to equation (23). In contrast to the polygynous man, the child quality
contributions of a cenogamous man are not necessarily such that the ratio of the marginal
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changes in each child’s quality is equal to the technical rate of substitution between the
quality of his two children. The reason is that the cenogamous man deals with putative
offspring. As a consequence, the concavity of function V comes into play. Nevertheless,
like their polygynous counterparts cenogamous cowives might also try to attract male
child quality contributions which in turn can affect the other cowife.
Finally, we study the efficiency condition obtained by dividing the male and female
first order necessary conditions:
a∂U(Cm)/∂C
a∂U(Cf )/∂C
=
1
4
∂Q(qf , qf )/∂q
∂Q(qf , qf )/∂q
[
1 +
∂V (2, Q¯)/∂Q
∂V (1, Qf )/∂Q
1
2
(
Q¯
Qf
)1
φ
]
(39)
Again, we have the technical rate of substitution on the right hand side. As in polyandry,
the true but unknown father free rides on his cohusbands child quality contributions and
men only maximize expected utility from reproduction. Like in polygyny husbands have
to consider that investments in one child only slightly change average child quality (third
term). Also, female and male marginal reproductive success due to changes in average
child quality appear but - as already mentioned as a polyandrous feature - only in expected
value for the male expression.
Similarly to the polyandrous case, it can be shown that the wealthier husband and the
wife that contributes more to the quality of her child could be better off in a monogamous
union under the assumption that differences among wives are not too big.
Proposition 2 Consider a cenogamous marriage with two cowives (f and g) and two
cohusbands (m and n). Without loss of generality, assume that Ym ≥ Yn and qf ≥ qg
(and hence Yf ≥ Yg) hold. Cohusband m would be better off in a monogamous union
with a noninvolved female h that contributes as much resources to child quality as his
cenogamous wife f , that is qf = qh.
In case that the qualities of children f and g are perfect complements in the average
child quality function, the cenogamous spouses m and f would have been better off in a
monogamous union. The same is true, in case cohusband n’s sum of contributions to the
qualities of children f and g is such that the following holds:
qnf + qng ≤ (qmf + qmg)qg
qf
⇔ qf
qg
≤ qmf + qmg
qnf + qng
(40)
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3.5 The Marriage Market
Having analyzed the different marital arrangements from an individual perspective, we will
now investigate a marriage market where all four forms of marital unions coexist.13 Our
first finding concerns the sheer number of possible matchings M = M(v, w). Consider,
for example, the case with v = || men and one woman (w = || = 1). The consent of
each partner provided, this woman can choose between v monogamous unions, v(v− 1)/2
polyandrous unions, and singlehood:
M(v, 1) =
v2 + v + 2
2
, v ∈ {0, 1, ..} (41)
With two women, there are v(v − 1)/2 cenogamous and v polygynous arrangements pos-
sible. Each of the v(v−1)/2 polyandrous unions for one female leaves M(v−2, 1) options
for the other female. Similarly, each of the v monogamous unions for one woman, leaves
M(v − 1, 1) possible unions for the other. In case, one woman remains single, there are
M(v, 1) possibilities left for the other woman. As a result, we get:
M(v, 2) =
v4 − 2v3 + 9v2 + 4v + 4
4
, v ∈ {0, 1, ..} (42)
possible matchings. Using symmetry (i.e. the fact that M(v, w) = M(v, w) holds) and
the results in (41) and (42), we obtain a recursive formula for the possible number of
matchings:
M(v, w) (43)
= 2M(v,w−1)+2vM(v−1,w−1)+v(v−1)M(v−2,w−1)+2(w−1)vM(v−1,w−2)+(w−1)(v−1)vM(v−2,w−2)
2
where w,m ∈ {2, 3, ..}.14 Note that this recursion grows much faster than the factorial
function. Consider, for example, five women and five men such that there are 5! = 120
purely monogamous matchings. If we allow for all other marital arrangements (plus sin-
glehood) and apply the above formula, we obtain a number of 29, 946 different matchings.
With ten women and ten men, there are already more than 1012 possible matchings.
In the following, we focus on the smallest possible mating market that can exhibit
all four marital unions: a market with two fertile women and men. From our discussion
above, we know that there are twelve possible matchings which are summarized in Table
13Market clearing can only be guaranteed if we allow for the possibility that individuals remain single.
Each individual, as a consequence, will therefore end up either polygamously married or monogamously
married or remain single. Utility of a member of a marital union will, of course, not only depend on the
specific union but also on the respective partners.
14We define: M(0, 0) = 0
21
2. Females {f} and {g} can be matched to males {m} and {n} but also to the pair {m,n}.
Of course they might as well remain single (i.e. matched to the empty set). The analogous
reasoning is true for men. Consider, for example, matchings M3 = {{f, n}, {g}, {m}} and
M10 = {{f, g,m}, {n}}. In matching M3, f and n form a monogamous union while g
and m remain single. In matching M10, m and the two women are married polygynously
while n remains single.
Table 2: Possible Matchings
Union (
⋃
) {f} {g} {f, g} {}
{m} M2,M6 M4,M7 M10 M1,M3,M5,M11
{n} M3,M7 M5,M6 M11 M1,M2,M4,M10
{m,n} M8 M9 M12 −
{} M1,M4,M5,M9 M1,M2,M3,M8 − −
As there is no algorithm that leads us to the set of stable matchings, we will simply
check each of the twelve possible matching for a blocking marital union.15 For this purpose,
we parameterize the model and solve it numerically. To be precise, we assume logarithmic
preferences over non-reproductive consumption. Utility from reproduction is assumed to
be Cobb-Douglas in the quality and quantity of own children. Child quality is determined
by the geometric mean of maternal and paternal contributions. Finally, average child
quality for a man with several wives is the result of a constant elasticity of substitution
aggregation procedure with parameter φ. Of greatest interest is the influence of individual
commands over economic resources on the formation of marital unions. For this reason,
we consider whole ranges for the endowments Yg and Yn of the poorer agents while we
have normalized the richer agents’ endowments Yf and Ym to unity.
Our results suggest that there are no stable matchings that include a polyandrous or
a cenogamous marriage. Stable matchings with monogamous marriages, in contrast, can
be found for all resource distributions considered. With respect to polygynous marriages,
results are mixed. The grey areas in Figure 1 display the regions where stable polygynous
marriages occur. As can be seen, a certain degree of inequality among men is necessary
for the occurrence of polygyny. Only in case of a sizeable wealth gap between men,
can the richer man contribute enough to the qualities of both of his children to prevent
the formation of a blocking coalition that involves the poorer man. With respect to
women, however, the opposite is true. A more equal distribution of resources among
15A generalization of the Gale-Shapley (1962) or related algorithms is not straightforward as individuals
might form elusive coalitions with members of their own sex.
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women is a prerequisite for the establishment of polygny as an alternative to other stable
matchings (most notably the assortative monogamous matching). When the wealth gap
between the two women is too big, the polygynous man’s utility gain from having two
children is more than offset by the utility loss due to a lower average child quality. As a
consequence, he (and his wealthier wife) would actually prefer a monogamous union. The
differences between the left and right diagrams underscore this intuition. A bigger value
of φ in the right diagram makes men more tolerant toward quality differences among their
children and increases the region where polygynous unions are stable in two directions.
An increased wealth gap among women now also becomes consistent with polygyny. The
same holds for some smaller wealth gaps among men.
Figure 1: Occurrence of Stable Matchings that include Polygynous Marriages.
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Notes: The grey areas indicate wealth distributions where stable matchings exist that include polygynous
unions. The left (right) diagram displays the results for a relatively low (high) elasticity of substitution
in the aggregation procedure with respect to average child quality (φ is equal to one half in the left and
equal to two in the right diagram). Stable matchings with monogamous traits occur over the whole area.
Polyandrous and cenogamous matchings are unstable throughout.
4 Conclusion
Among others, the institution of marriage serves economic, educational, and psychological
purposes. First and foremost, however, it is a reproductive agreement. With only a few
(recent) exceptions, this fact has been rarely addressed in the economic literature on
marriage. This paper views marriage as a solely reproductive union between males and
females.
We show that biological asymmetries with respect to offspring recognition and re-
productive capacity are sufficient to explain why monogamy is most common and why
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among the polygamous arrangements polygyny is so widespread, polyandry so rare, and
cenogamy virtually absent. Our investigations focus on parental contributions to child
quality and we show that monogamous unions meet a minimum constraint on technical
efficiency. With some restrictions, polygynous unions can meet this criterion, too. In
general, however, polygamous unions (of any kind) turn out to have difficulties to meet
the criterion. In this context, risk aversion in the face of paternal uncertainty is one but
not the only reason for distortions. Another distortion stems from strategic behavior and
free-riding when marital unions comprise more than the biological parents of a child. Both
work in favor of monogamy and against polygamy.
Our findings suggest that fertility considerations, differences between the sexes, and
the importance of own children are key to understand the foundations of marriage and the
shaping of marriage regimes. We therefore argue that reproductive considerations have to
be taken seriously when explaining predominant marriage regimes but also when exploring
marriage decisions and patterns. Most importantly, ongoing discussions about reforming
the institution of marriage should not ignore the interplay of technological change on
the one hand and the close link between human reproduction and marital arrangements
on the other. For the possibility of genetic paternity testing can eliminate asymmetry
in offspring recognition. As a result, the institution of marriage looses its reproductive
rationale and other purposes of marriage such as economic and romantic ones no doubt
will gain importance.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is by contradiction:
U(Cm) + V (1, Q(qg, qmf )) ≤ U(Cm) + E [V (1, Q(qf , qmf + qnf ))] (44)
The right hand side refers to the man’s expected utility in the polyandrous union and
we assume that child quality contributions are chosen optimally (cf. Section 3.3). The
left hand side describes the monogamous union with female g and m simply uses his
polyandrous child quality contributions. Therefore, we can drop the utility derived from
non-reproductive consumption. Moreover, we know that qmf ≥ qnf holds such that we
can write:
V (1, Q(qg, qmf )) ≤ 1
2
V (1, Q(qf , 2qmf )) <
1
2
V (1, 2Q(qf , qmf )) < V (1, Q(qf , qmf ))
(45)
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Note that we have used the following properties: Q has increasing returns with respect to
q and constant returns with respect to parental contributions taken together. Moreover
we have used concavity of V with respect to Q. Since we have assumed that qf = qg
hold, we have indeed constructed a contradiction which proves our claim that m is better
off in a monogamous union with g.
Second, we show that f and m are better off if they form a monogamous union in
case qnf = 0 holds. A neccessary and sufficient condition for this to be the case is that
m contributes more to the quality of child f than under polyandry. Let q˜mf denote his
contributions under monogamy and suppose that q˜mf ≤ qmf holds:
a
∂U(Ym − aq˜mf )
∂C
≤ a∂U(Ym − aqmf )
∂C
. (46)
Using the optimal female contributions under polyandry, m’s first order neccessary con-
ditions under monogamy and polyandry (17 and 28) lead us to a contradiction:
∂V (1, Q(qf , q˜mf ))
∂Q
∂Q(qf , q˜mf )
∂q
<
1
2
∂V (1, Q(qf , qmf ))
∂Q
∂Q(qf , qmf )
∂q
. (47)
This contradicts our initial assumption and we infer that q˜mf > qmf holds. Hence, we
have indeed shown that f and m are better off under monogamy.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by contradiction:
U(Cm) + V (1, Q(qh, qmf + qmg)) ≤ U(Cm) + E [V (Km, Q)] . (48)
The right hand side refers to the man’s expected utility in the cenogamous union and we
assume that child quality contributions are chosen optimally (cf. Section 3.4). The left
hand side describes the monogamous union with female h. The man simply contributes
the sum of his cenogamous child quality investments (i.e. qmf + qmg) to child h:
V (1, Q(qh, qmf + qmg)) ≤ 14V (1, Q(qf , qf )) + 14V (1, Q(qg, qg)) + 14V
(
2, Q¯
)
⇔ V (1, Q(qh, qmf + qmg)) < 14V (1, Q(qf , qf )) + 14V (1, Q(qf , qg)) + 12V (1,
Qf+Qg
2
)
⇔ V (1, Q(qh, qmf + qmg)) < 12V
(
1, Q(qf ,
qf+qg
2
)
)
+ 1
2
V
(
1, 1
2
Q(qf , qf ) +
1
2
Q(qf , qg)
)
⇔ V (1, Q(qh, qmf + qmg)) < 12V
(
1, Q(qf ,
qf+qg
2
)
)
+ 1
2
V
(
1, Q(qf ,
qf+qg
2
)
)
. (49)
Note that we have used qf ≥ qg, increasing returns of Q with respect to q, concavity
of V with respect to K, and the fact that Q¯ ≤ 1
2
Qf +
1
2
Qg holds for all values of φ. Next,
let q¯ denote the average child quality contribution of a single husband, that is we define
q¯ ≡ (qf + qg)/2. We obtain:
V (1, Q(qh, qmf + qmg)) < V
(
1, Q(qf , q¯)
)
(50)
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Because of qh = qf and qmf + qmg ≥ q¯ ≥ qnf + qng, we have again constructed a
contradiction and m is indeed better off in a monogamous union with h. Furthermore, we
infer that m’s quality contributions to the monogamously sired child h exceeds the sum
of his contributions to children f and g, that is:
q˜mh > qmf + qmg (51)
Second, we show that f and m are better off if they form a monogamous union in case
φ → 0 holds. With respect to the previous result, it sufficies to show that f is better off
in the monogamous union with m. Note that φ → 0 is the Leontieff case meaning that
men will not tolerate any quality differences between their children, i.e. we consider equal
child qualities Qf = Qg:
Q(qf , qmf + qnf ) = Q(qg, qmg + qng) ⇒ Q(qf , qmf + qnf ) ≤ Q(qf , qmg + qng) (52)
The inequality means that qf ≤ qg must hold which in turn implies that qmf +qnf ≤ q¯.
Since Ym ≥ Yn implies that q¯ ≤ qmf + qmg < q˜mf holds, we know that child f receives
more male contributions under monogamy than under cenogamy (in case φ → 0 holds).
Hence, f is better off under monogamy.
Third, we show that f and m are better off if they form a monogamous union in case
the following condition is satisfied:
qmf + qmg
qnf + qng
≥ qf
qg
(53)
Condition (53) guarantees that female f does not experience a utility loss in a monoga-
mous union with m. Because it ensures that m’s child quality investments (qmf +qmg) are
not less than the male contributions to the quality of child f . In fact, the joint contribu-
tions of the two cohusbands to the quality of child f (i.e. qf = qmf + qnf ) are exceeding
the wealthier man’s quality contributions (qmf + qmg) to both children if and only if:
∂Q
(
1,
qmf+qmg
qf
)
/∂q
∂Q
(
1,
qnf+qng
qg
)
/∂q
>
∂V (1,Q(qg ,qnf+qng))
∂Q
+ ∂V (2,Q¯)
∂Q
1
2
(
Q¯
Q(qg ,qnf+qng)
)1
φ
∂V (1,Q(qf ,qmf+qmg))
∂Q
+ ∂V (2,Q¯)
∂Q
1
2
(
Q¯
Q(qf ,qmf+qmg)
)1
φ
(54)
where we used the fact that partial derivatives of a differentiable linear-homogeneous
function are homogeneous of degree zero. Note that Q(qf , qm) ≥ Q(qg, qn) holds. Under
the assumption (53), the left hand side is not bigger than one while the right hand side
cannot be smaller than one such that we have again constructed a contradiction. As a
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result, we have proven that the husband with at least as much resources as his cohusband
and the wife which contributes at least as much child quality units as her cowife are always
better off in a monogamous union if φ → 0 or (53) hold. Then, f and m form a blocking
pair that prevents the formation of the cenogamous union.
Furthermore, we want to add that the inequality in (54) tends to be violated even
when we allow the relative difference between the female child contributions to exceed
the male difference or when we allow for some degree of substitutability in the average
child quality function. So that cenogamy is indeed very unstable. Moreover, it is hard
to think of reasons that cause the poorer female g to enter a union where the amount of
male resources that she attracts is smaller than the amount contributed by the poorer
cohusband.
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